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ABSTRACT
This Article asks whether the openness to court-packing expressed
by a number of Democratic presidential candidates (e.g., Pete Buttigieg)
is democratically defensible. More specifically, it asks whether it is
possible to break the apparent link between demagogic populism and
court-packing, and it examines three possible ways of doing this via Bruce
Ackerman’s dualist theory of constitutional moments—a theory which
offers the possibility of legitimating problematic pathways to
constitutional change on democratic but non-populist grounds. In the end,
the Article suggests that an Ackermanian perspective offers just one,
extremely limited pathway to democratically legitimate court-packing in
2021: namely, where a Democratic President and Congress would be
willing to limit themselves to using court reform as a means of repudiating
the Republican Party’s constitutional gains but not as a means of pursuing
(in fact or in appearance) their own comprehensive reform agenda. The
question that this analysis leaves hanging is whether this pathway remains
satisfactory when concerns aside from democratic legitimacy are factored
into the equation, such as a concern with the protection of certain
fundamental rights, or with the possibility of public and institutional
backlash against court-packing.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, court-packing has become increasingly synonymous
with authoritarian populism1 because of its use by right-wing populists in
various countries2 as a way of avoiding institutional oversight and scrutiny
(a key hallmark of modern populism). At the same time, though, as the
United States Democratic Party’s presidential campaigns trundled on, and
as potential nominees grappled with how to distinguish their politics from
the current President’s populism, court-packing began gaining traction as
a potentially legitimate and non-populist legislative option for a
Democratic President and Congress in 2021. According to a recent article
on the website Mother Jones, court-packing started creeping into
the Democratic mainstream when presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg
claimed during a public appearance that it would be a reasonable
response to the problematic tactics that the Republican Party has recently

1. For an analysis of the authoritarian populism now sweeping the world, see JAN-WERNER
MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? (2016). On the link between populism and court-packing, see Andrew
Arato, Populism, Constitutional Courts, and Civil Society, in JUDICIAL POWER: HOW
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AFFECT POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS 318, 318–41 (Christine Landfried
ed., 2019). While the term “populism” has been used lately to cover all manner of political sins, this
Article will follow Müller’s analysis by emphasizing two core elements: anti-institutionalism and antipluralism. On the one hand, anti-institutionalism refers to the tendency of populists to reject
institutional checks on their authority, specifically on the grounds that “they, and they alone, represent
the people.” MÜLLER, supra, at 3 (emphasis added). On the other hand, anti-pluralism refers to the
tendency of populists to conflate the people with their supporters, see, e.g., MÜLLER, supra, at 4–5,
thereby lending a twisted plausibility to their claims that they authentically and fully represent “the
people.”
2. Poland’s experience under the Law and Justice Party is a prime example of this (an example
to which this Article will occasionally refer). See Wojciech Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in
Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding, JUDGES F. REV. 104 (2018); see
also Piotr Mikuli, The Declining State of the Judiciary in Poland, INT’L J. CONST. L. I-CONNECT
BLOG (May 15, 2018), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/05/the-declining-state-of-the-judiciary-inpoland/ [https://perma.cc/A8ZG-7KGW].
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used to ideologically reshape the federal judiciary and, by derivation,
the Constitution.3
To rehash the well-known story on these Republican tactics, first
there was Merrick Garland, President Obama’s Supreme Court nominee
who was “stonewalled”4 by a Republican-controlled Senate on extremely
questionable grounds.5 Then, more recently, there was Brett Kavanaugh,
whose Supreme Court confirmation was delivered by a Republican Senate
in the midst of serious concerns over both his judicial temperament6 and
his history of alleged violence against women (denied aggressively by
Kavanaugh).7 Surely, Buttigieg suggested, these democratically
problematic power grabs by Republicans render even seemingly extreme
counter-tactics like the expansion of the Supreme Court at least thinkable
for Democrats if (and that’s a big “if”) they take Congress and the
Presidency in 2021.
Since Buttigieg’s initial comments, a number of other presidential
candidates, including Senators Elizabeth Warren and Kamala Harris,
joined him in expressing their openness to various forms of court-packing
(or more specifically, Supreme Court expansion).8 The question is: where
does this leave us? Is court-packing, a perfectly legal and constitutional
tactic in the U.S., now politically and morally thinkable too? Or, to put it
more precisely, can court-packing be framed as a plausibly non-populist
response to the democratically questionable actions of Senate
Republicans? This Article attempts to answer this question by engaging
with the dualist theory of constitutional transformation that has been

3. See Pema Levy, How Court-Packing Went from a Fringe Idea to a Serious Democratic
Proposal, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/03/courtpacking-2020/ [https://perma.cc/FFP4-SSJA].
4. Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148, 150
(2019).
5. See, e.g., Eric Zorn, B-b-but What about the “Biden Rule”?, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2017),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/eric-zorn/ct-b-b-but-what-about-the-biden-rule-20170407story.html [https://perma.cc/Z2RV-SFR2].
6. For a detailed and critical account of Kavanaugh’s most controversial statements, see
Laurence Tribe, Opinion, All the Ways a Justice Kavanaugh Would Have to Recuse Himself, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/opinion/justice-kavanaugh-recusehimself.html [https://perma.cc/SVC2-DHUQ]; see also Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4, at 158–59
(“At the . . . [Blasey Ford] hearing, Justice Kavanaugh offered testimony that shocked many. He
lambasted the ‘two-week effort’ effort surrounding the allegations as ‘a calculated and orchestrated
political hit,’ a form of ‘[r]evenge on behalf of the Clintons.’”).
7. See generally Christine Hauser, The Women who Have Accused Brett Kavanaugh, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-accuserswomen.html [https://perma.cc/55ND-UUBV].
8. See Levy, supra note 3.
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elaborated over several decades by Yale law professor Bruce Ackerman.9
While Ackerman’s theory is certainly not the only way of addressing this
question, it has at least one key benefit when it comes to the quest for a
non-populist defense of court-packing. Put simply, in contrast with
populist constitutional theories (e.g., Carl Schmitt’s10) that are ready to
endorse illegal or uncivil pathways to constitutional change on the basis
of a change’s popularity, Ackerman’s theory withholds such endorsement
until a series of stringent tests have been met,11 thereby offering the
possibility that democratically problematic tactics like court-packing can
potentially be “made good”12 or “perfected”13 without accepting the
populist belief that a single group (even a public majority) is alone capable
of legitimating such tactics (tactics that are broadly at odds, one might say,
with America’s prevailing “sense of justice”14).15 In other words,
Ackerman gives us what populism gives us vis-à-vis court-packing—i.e.,
the possibility of democratic legitimation—without giving us populism
(and in particular, without embracing the core populist doctrine of “organ

9. Ackerman’s theory is laid out in numerous books and journal articles, but its most
comprehensive elaboration is in his first volume. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1993).
10. Schmitt famously distinguished between the higher authority of the “absolute” constitution,
which he defined as the existent unity of a political community or a people, and the lower authority of
the “relative” constitution, which he defined as the various constitutional laws in force at a given point
in time (in force, for Schmitt, at the fragile behest of the political community). On this distinction, see
CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 59–71 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans.) (1928).
11. To quote Ackerman:
The Constitution is, first and foremost, a project in democratic self-rule, providing us with
institutions and a language by which we may discriminate between the passing show of
normal politics and the deeper movements in popular opinion which, after much passionate
debate and institutional struggle, ultimately earn a democratic place in the constitutional
law of a Republic committed to the rule of We the People.
Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1178–79 (1988) (emphasis
added).
12. One of the key ways in which Ackerman describes this “making good” is by quoting James
Madison’s claim, in Federalist No. 40, that an expression of popular support for a reform initiative
could serve to “blot out antecedent errors and irregularities” in the process of reform—even errors as
severe as the failure of an institution to act within its legal powers (as per accusations against the
Philadelphia Convention of which Madison was a part). See ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 173–74.
13. See generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 93 (1998)
(comparing Ackerman’s model of constitutional lawmaking to the property law doctrine of adverse
possession, which allows an initially illegal occupant of land to eventually obtain good title by
complying with a set of stringent tests over time).
14. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 450–51 (1971). I do not mean to suggest here that
Americans today share any common sense of justice, generally; only that many politically engaged
Americans seem to share a sense of serious anxiety about court-packing, at least to the point where
they would feel especially aggrieved if it was used by their political opponents to reshape
constitutional law (more aggrieved than if the judicial appointments process was used, for example).
15. Populism, and Ackerman’s departure from populism, will be discussed at the end of Section
I of the Article, after I have laid out the key features of Ackerman’s constitutional theory.
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sovereignty,”16 where a single group or entity is presumed competent to
authoritatively represent the People at a particular moment in time).
Bearing this benefit of an Ackermanian perspective in mind, this
Article will begin by offering a brief reconstruction of Ackerman’s theory
before examining three ways in which court-packing could potentially be
democratically legitimated within Ackerman’s theory: (1) as a way of
consolidating an almost completed process of constitutional reform; (2) as
a way of initiating a process of constitutional reform; and (3) as a
constitutionally conservative reaction to another group’s attempt to
achieve the “factional abduction”17 of the judiciary and constitutional law.
To state my conclusion up front, I will argue that the third option could be
successfully deployed as a justification for Democratic court-packing in
2021, provided that the Democrats tread carefully and slowly when it
comes to pursuing a more comprehensive and controversial package of
legal reforms. In this regard, one could say that my argument turns on a
critical distinction between transformative court-packing, as practiced
recently in countries like Poland,18 and conservative court-packing in the
face of an attempted but apparently illegitimate transformation of
constitutional law by others. Thinking about it in this way, I hope, will do
two things: (1) offer a way for American Democrats to philosophically
distinguish their seemingly well-intentioned court reform plans from those
of authoritarian populists like the Law and Justice Party in Poland
(Erdogan’s Turkey springs to mind as well19) and (2) highlight the fragility
of such a distinction—because if even Ackerman’s theory of popular
constitutional change leaves little room for justification despite its
tolerance of illegal and broadly uncivil reform tactics, it should be clear
that justification is a delicate business indeed.
With of all of this said, before proceeding I should make clear that
the concern of this Article is only with the question of how court-packing
might be cast as a democratically legitimate or perhaps simply tolerable
tactic via Ackerman’s theory of constitutional change. By limiting itself to
this relatively narrow line of inquiry, the Article neglects (or rather
brackets) at least three other, undeniably important questions relating to
the prospect of court-packing in 2021. First, excepting a glancing
comment in its concluding section, the Article does not engage with the
16. ANDREW ARATO, THE ADVENTURES OF THE CONSTITUENT POWER: BEYOND
REVOLUTIONS? 23 (2018).
17. I borrow this phrasing from JOHAN WILLEM GOUS VAN DER WALT, THE HORIZONTAL
EFFECT REVOLUTION AND THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY 303 (2014).
18. See Arato, supra note 1; see also Sadurski, supra note 2.
19. On the complexity of the Turkish situation, see Cem Tecimer, Recognizing Court-Packing:
Perception and Reality in the Case of the Turkish Constitutional Court, VERFBLOG (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://verfassungsblog.de/recognizing-court-packing/ [https://perma.cc/4VEP-BDS3].
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important question of whether court-packing would remain defensible
when other standards of legitimacy (or indeed, political wisdom) are
considered. Second, it does not deal with the equally important question
of whether court-packing would be narrowly tailored to its aims; the
question, in other words, of whether the Democrats could use less
democratically questionable tactics (e.g., issue-specific legislation) to
overcome the allegedly unjustified slant of the U.S. Supreme Court at
present.20 Third, it neglects Ackerman’s own recent comments about court
reform on the grounds that these comments tell us little, if anything, about
the democratic legitimacy of court-packing.21 While the Article’s failure
to address these issues obviously limits the force of its conclusions, I have
isolated the question of democratic legitimacy for an important reason: to
show how precarious a defense of court-packing is even where only one
measure (i.e., democratic legitimacy) is considered, and even where a
theoretical lens (i.e., Ackerman’s) has been chosen to maximize the
chances of a successful defense. Above all others, it is this point that I hope
the reader will bear in mind as we proceed to a short reconstruction of
Ackerman’s theory in the Article’s first section below.
I. ACKERMAN’S DUALIST THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS
To begin our engagement with Ackerman, it is perhaps useful to
consider a distinction that the constitutional theorist Joel Colón-Ríos

20. In this regard, consider Elizabeth Warren’s proposed response to the hypothetical
overturning of Roe v. Wade. Associated Press, Elizabeth Warren Unveils Plan to Protect Abortion
Rights, L.A. TIMES (May 17, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-elizabeth-warrenabortion-platform-2020-story.html [https://perma.cc/XEP7-ZQVF]. Very simply, Warren’s claim is
that a Democratic government’s best option in this situation would be to forget about constitutional
law and focus on passing ordinary legislation mimicking Roe’s protections. Id. While such legislation
would of course be more vulnerable to repeal than an authoritative interpretation of constitutional law,
it would at least secure the Democrats’ policy preferences during their time in power, provided that
the Supreme Court does not take the basically unthinkable step of flipping Roe on its head by
recognizing the constitutional personhood of the unborn and requiring the criminalization of abortion
(like the German Constitutional Court did in its Erste Abtreibung judgment of 1975, described in VAN
DER WALT, supra note 17, at 130–51).
21. I am aware of a number of comments that Ackerman has made recently on court reform, but
none of them are strictly relevant here. For example, in his latest book, Revolutionary Constitutions,
Ackerman discusses the prospect of Democratic court-packing, but this discussion focuses on the way
that court-packing might play out politically, not on the normative dimension of how it fits with a
dualist conception of political morality. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONS:
CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE RULE OF LAW 397–403 (2019); see also Bruce Ackerman,
Opinion, Trust in the Justices of the Supreme Court Is Waning. Here Are Three Ways to Fortify the
Court, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-ackermansupreme-court-reconstruction-20181220-story.html [https://perma.cc/FV7D-Z7XJ] (focusing on how
reforms other than court-packing might bolster the sociological legitimacy of the Supreme Court).
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makes between two dimensions of democracy.22 While the first dimension
refers to a people’s capacity to influence every day decision-making
within their political system23 (e.g., by voting for political representatives),
the second dimension refers to their more fundamental capacity to actually
change the system by amending the constitutional laws that give
it structure24 (or indeed, by making an entirely new constitution).
For Colón-Ríos, the problem with many modern constitutional
democracies is that they provide ample room for the first dimension but
scant room for the second, specifically insofar as modern constitutions
often include complex amendment formulae that make democratic change
unlikely.25 How can we speak of democracy, Colón-Ríos’s work wonders,
if the supposedly sovereign people are incapable of producing radical,
systemic change; second-dimension change as opposed to the electoral
“changing of the guards” that defines the first dimension of democracy?
In his We the People trilogy, Ackerman asks this same question in
relation to the U.S., but he goes further by asking whether the complex
amendment requirements contained in Article V of the Constitution have
really stymied publicly desired, tectonic changes to U.S. constitutional
law, even if Article V itself has rarely produced such changes.26 In his
response to this question, Ackerman claims that, rather than suppressing
initiatives for seismic change completely, the arduous requirements of
Article V have driven reformists to rely on an alternative, informal

22. JOEL I. COLÓN-RÍOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE
QUESTION OF CONSTITUENT POWER 36–40 (2012).
23. Id. Colón-Ríos also refers to this as “democracy at the level of daily governance.” Id. at 36.
To suggest that such democracy is present in a particular country, he says, usually means “suggesting
that that country’s laws and institutions provide for frequent elections, that citizens are allowed to
associate in different organisations (including political parties) and to express their political opinions
without fear of punishment.” Id. at 37.
24. Id. at 38. To quote Colón-Ríos:
The second dimension of democracy . . . is not about the daily workings of the state’s
political apparatus, but about the relation of citizens to their constitution. It looks at how a
constitutional regime came into existence and how it can be altered . . . [and i]n that
respect, it revolves around the following two questions: (1) Is this constitution the result of
a democratic process? (2) Can this constitution be altered through democratic means?
Id.
25. Id. at 17–18. To quote Colón-Ríos:
Constitutionalism is . . . [partly] characterised by a Lycurgian obsession with permanence,
a fear of constitutional change according to which a constitution that contains the right
content—a good, constitutionalist constitution—should also be a finished constitution.
That is, a constitution that might be improved by correcting some historical mistakes here
and there . . . but whose fundamental principles and the governmental structures it creates
should be more or less immutable and therefore placed beyond the scope of popular
majorities.
Id.
26. See ACKERMAN, supra note 9.
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amendment track that he calls the “modern system”27 of amendment.28 In
contrast with the steep federal and state requirements of Article V, the
modern system applies a more flexible, intertwined pair of national tests
to constitutional reform movements: (1) a test of “duration”29 and (2) a test
of dialogue. On the one hand, the test of duration requires that a reform
movement remains consistently popular, nationally, over the course of a
“generation”30 (preferably a decade or so). On the other hand, the test of
dialogue requires that a reform initiative is subjected to an especially
intense level of public debate, with reformist institutions pitted against
conservative ones in a contest for the country’s soul. Where an initiative
passes these tests, Ackerman suggests it will have earned admission to the
country’s “constitutional canon,”31 which is to say that its institutional
advocates will have earned the “[a]uthority to speak for the People”32
and to have their initiative counted as constitutional law. When completed,
Ackerman refers to this process as a “constitutional moment”—a moment
when the People themselves can be retroactively regarded as having
come together to “hammer out a considered judgment on a fundamental
matter of principle.”33
In his We the People trilogy, Ackerman has identified four such
constitutional moments that have occurred over the course of American
history: the Founding (bypassing the Articles of Confederation rather than
Article V), Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Civil Rights Revolution
(or the “Second Reconstruction”34).35 In all of these cases, for Ackerman,
27. See id. at 268.
28. To quote Sanford Levinson on this aspect of Ackerman’s work:
There is something at once splendid and perplexing about the Ackermanian scheme of
epicycles that constitute constitutional amendment outside the formal constraints of Article
V. Recognizing the patent defects of the 1787 constitutional document, Ackerman has
devoted what is now the bulk of his career to demonstrating that it is in fact not a fatal bar
to constitutional rectification. Remarkable things have happened.
Sanford Levinson, Popular Sovereignty and the United States Constitution: Tensions in the
Ackermanian Program, 123 YALE L.J. 2644, 2666 (2014).
29. Emilios Christodoulidis, The Degenerative Constitutional Moment: Bruce Ackerman and
The Decline and Fall of the American Republic, 74 MOD. L. REV. 962, 967 (2011) (noting, with
reference to one of Ackerman’s later books, that the “question of duration” is given pride of place in
Ackerman’s theory of constitutional change).
30. As Ackerman puts it, the “basic unit” of the U.S. Constitution, from his perspective, is the
“Generation.” Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 1519 (1997).
31. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 7 (2014).
32. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 4.
33. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 55.
34. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 1.
35. In the first two volumes of his We the People trilogy, Ackerman only counted the Founding,
Reconstruction, and the New Deal as completed constitutional moments. The Civil Rights Revolution,
by contrast, was characterized as a seemingly “lesser” moment of “constitutional politics” until its
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the failure to properly use a legally applicable amendment rule can be
compensated for, democratically speaking, by compliance with the two,
intertwined tests proposed above. To understand the dynamics of this
process more precisely, consider the Civil Rights Revolution, Ackerman’s
most recent example of a constitutional moment.36 For Ackerman, while
the starting point of the Civil Rights Revolution as a constitutional moment
could certainly be cast in terms of the “rich history”37 of social activism
that preceded legal reform, the really critical moment—the turning point,
if you like—was when this activism was given institutional recognition at
the federal level, in this case by the U.S. Supreme Court.38 On this front,
Ackerman claims that the Supreme Court’s path-breaking decision in
Brown v. Board of Education39 initiated the informal amendment process
by issuing what he calls a “constitutional signal”40 to the other branches of
the federal government (and indeed, to the “ordinary American[s]”41 who,
for Ackerman, collectively hold the keys to the Constitution). By placing
the issue of civil rights more firmly on the national agenda, the Court made
it necessary for Congress and the President to respond, and this in turn
allowed the American public to pass judgment on their responses, at least
obliquely, when both institutions came up for reelection.
What follows such acts of signaling, for Ackerman, is then a slow
burning, electorally tested battle between constitutional reformists and
constitutional conservatives. To win this battle, reformists have to keep
winning across a full generation, but with each victory, they earn a little
more authority to push the envelope a little further—a little more beyond
the “constitutional status quo.”42 Coming back to the Civil Rights
eventual admission to the list of full constitutional moments in We the People: The Civil Rights
Revolution. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 31. On the “lesser” status of the civil rights
movement in Ackerman’s early work, see Christy Scott, Constitutional Moments and Crockpot
Revolutions, 25 CONN. L. REV. 967, 975 (1993).
36. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 31. Ackerman’s We the People: The Civil Rights
Revolution is fundamentally concerned, in its entirety, with depicting the civil rights revolution as a
constitutional moment that followed closely in the footsteps—structurally speaking—of earlier
constitutional moments like the New Deal.
37. Id. at 49.
38. Ackerman has taken some flak for his failure to pay closer, more direct attention to the social
as well as institutional histories that are at stake in periods of constitutional upheaval. For his response
to these criticisms, see Bruce Ackerman, De-Schooling Constitutional Law, 123 YALE L.J. 3104, 3116
(2014).
39. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
40. This concept will be discussed in more detail later in the article. For now, see ACKERMAN,
supra note 9, at 272–78.
41. Christodoulidis, supra note 29, at 968. To quote Christodoulidis: “The ‘ordinary American’
is doing a lot of normative work in [Ackerman’s theory].” Id.
42. This phrase is used frequently in Ackerman’s work to designate legally dominant
conceptions of constitutional norms and principles at a given moment. As an example, see ACKERMAN,
supra note 31, at 3.
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Revolution, Ackerman sees the 1964 presidential election as a crucial
legitimating device, specifically insofar as it pitted President Lyndon
Johnson (LBJ) and his newly passed Civil Rights Act (CRA) against a very
clear, anti-CRA opponent, Barry Goldwater.43 With Goldwater subjected
to a “crushing defeat”44 in 1964, the Democrats then used their fresh,
raised mandate to legitimately pursue further, deeper change by passing
other “landmark”45 or “super”46 statutes like the Voting Rights Act.
However, for these statutes to gain decisive admittance into the American
“constitutional canon,”47 Ackerman claims that one of two things still had
to happen: either reformists could win another “ratifying election,”48 or
their opponents could undertake a calculated “switch in time,”49 revealing
their judgment that constitutional conservatism on the relevant set of
issues had become publicly indefensible. In the case of the Civil Rights
Revolution, it was the Republican National Committee (RNC) that
apparently chose the latter path, the switch in time, by choosing Richard
Nixon as their presidential candidate—a “man with a long-standing
commitment to civil rights”50 who ended up playing a “key role in . . . the
passage of the Fair Housing Act,”51 and in constitutionally consolidating
the legacy of earlier reformers like LBJ and Justice Earl Warren.52
What lies behind all of this, to dig a little deeper, is basically a
“dualistic” distinction between a population of voters (or a small-p people)
and a People (or a capital-P People) that is made evident by Ackerman’s
claim that in general, the “People simply do not exist.” 53 To explain this
perhaps perplexing claim, although Ackerman wishes to defend
constitutional change beyond Article V,54 he fully subscribes to the
conception of political morality which is inherent in Article V, a
conception which turns on the idea that the public and congressional
majorities that are in effect jointly responsible for ordinary lawmaking are
not equivalent to the sovereign entity, “We the People of the United States
of America,” the entity that is alone authorized to amend the U.S.
43. See ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 66–69.
44. Id. at 77.
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id. at 34.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 76–79.
49. The classic example of such a “switch” is of course the Supreme Court’s repudiation of its
Lochner-era jurisprudence, starting in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). For
Ackerman’s analysis of this switch, see ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 312–82.
50. ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 77.
51. Id.
52. I should make clear that this is Ackerman’s view of Nixon and his position in relation to civil
rights rather than mine.
53. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 263.
54. Id.
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Constitution.55 While this sovereign entity is in many ways little more than
a “constitutive fiction,”56 Ackerman follows the moral flow of Article V
closely in supposing that the products of an extraordinary, relatively
arduous, and highly deliberative lawmaking procedure can be justifiably
“attributed”57 or “imputed”58 to the People, and that such attribution is
occasionally necessary to redeem the Jeffersonian promise that “each
generation . . . [can] choose for itself the form of government it believes
most promotive of its own happiness.”59 This is Ackerman’s democratic
dualism in a nutshell: the idea that democratic lawmaking should take
place along two tracks, one more straightforward track that applies
to ordinary lawmaking, and a more demanding but crucially still
accessible track that applies to constitutional or “higher” lawmaking, and
that comes closer to justifying the “transubstantiation”60 of relevant
decision-makers into the perpetually absent but representationally
sovereign figure of “the People” (or more accurately, the “attribution” of
their decision to the People).
Fair enough, you might think. But what exactly does this have to do
with the prospect of court-packing under a Democratic Presidency and
Congress in 2021? As noted in the introductory section of this Article, the
value of Ackerman’s theory when it comes to court-packing is that his
insistence on the supremacy of a slowly emerging popular sovereign offers
a way of legitimating controversial methods of implementing
constitutional change61 (like court-packing) without necessarily becoming
55. As Ackerman notes, this point can be traced all the way back to The Federalist Papers, which
repeatedly distinguishes not only between elected government and the people themselves but
also between the people and a popular majority motivated by its own self-interest (Madison refers to
self-interested majorities as mere “factions” in Federalist No. 10). See ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at
165–99.
56. See Levinson, supra note 28, at 2653.
57. See Hans Lindahl, Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of
Collective Selfhood, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 11 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2008).
58. See Emilios Christodoulidis, The Aporia of Sovereignty: On the Representation of the People
in Constitutional Discourse, 12 KING’S L.J. 111, 119 (2001).
59. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Samuel Kercheval, in SELECTIONS FROM THE PERSONAL,
POLITICAL, AND PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 352 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1967).
60. As Ackerman puts it, “no institution of normal politics can be allowed to transubstantiate
itself into the People.” ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 182. The evident implication of this is that an
extraordinary institution or coalition of institutions can “transubstantiate itself into the People,” and
Ackerman’s work addresses itself insistently to the problem of when this conversion is defensible in
the United States. Id.
61. Ackerman evidently takes inspiration from the Founders here:
To . . . [the Founders], the legally anomalous character of the “convention” was not a sign
of defective legal status but of revolutionary possibility—that a group of patriots might
speak for the People with greater political legitimacy than any assembly whose authority
arose only from its legal form.
ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 175.
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an apologist for the populism of, say, the Law and Justice Party in
Poland (I will say more on this populism in the next paragraph).62 To offer
some clarification on the way that he thinks about this problem,
the problem of legal or political-moral “errors”63 in processes of
constitutional change, Ackerman refers us to property law and the doctrine
of adverse possession.64
As Ackerman explains in the second volume of his We the People
trilogy, the relevance of the comparison to adverse possession lies in the
fact that, much like his system of informal constitutional amendment, the
“doctrine of adverse possession allows a concededly illegal occupant of
land to perfect . . . his title”65 to that land by publicly complying with a set
of “rigorous conditions”66 and by “successfully maintain[ing] his
dominion for many years.”67 This leads to a difficult question, though: the
question of how exactly one ought to view the initial act of occupation or,
moving from property law back to constitutional law, the dubious tactics
that end up yielding a constitutional moment a number of years down the
line. Does the legitimacy of such tactics depend exclusively on the way a
budding constitutional moment ends up playing out, i.e., can the use of any
tactics be retroactively vindicated by a subsequently constructed
manifestation of popular sovereignty? Or, conversely, can we distinguish
in advance between more and less legitimate tactics in the pursuit of
informal constitutional change, perhaps to the point where a constitutional
moment could be deemed invalid if it depended or relied too heavily on
certain problematic tactics at certain points?
We will return to these crucial questions at the end of the next
section,68 but not before offering a short summary of Ackerman’s theory
in order to better elucidate its relation to modern populism—a concept that
62. Ackerman frames this point by suggesting that his democratic dualism seeks a “third way”
between “legalistic perfection” and the “lawless force” of populist usurpation. ACKERMAN, supra note
13, at 33, 116.
63. See ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 174 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison)).
64. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 93–95.
65. Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. Id. After highlighting this requirement of protracted dominion in property law, Ackerman
continues:
So too in constitutional law. Popular sovereignty cannot be won in a single moment. As at
the Founding, a rising reform movement must engage in a temporally extended process—
in which it is obliged to defend its claims to speak for the People time and again in a series
of escalating institutional contests for public support.
Id.
68. To be more precise, these questions will be discussed at the end of Section II of this
Article, on the idea of court-packing as a move to consolidate a nearly complete constitutional moment
(“Option One: Court-Packing as a Move to Consolidate a Constitutional Moment?”). See infra
pp.48-54.
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I have thus far left lurking in the shadows. At the risk of
oversimplification, one can arguably distil modern populism down to two
core theses: (1) that the will of the people is superior to all law, including
constitutional law,69 and (2) that the will of the people can be adequately
represented—and is in fact best represented—by a single actor or
institution that authentically embodies the people’s spirit at a given point
in time (Andrew Arato refers to this thesis using the term “organ
sovereignty”70). While Ackerman evidently accepts the first thesis, he just
as evidently rejects the second thesis, breaking the link between his theory
and populism by insisting that the pathway to popular sovereignty is not
through direct embodiment (or as he puts it, through allowing a single
institution to “transubstantiate itself into the People”71), but through the
effective operation of the federal separation of powers across a
generation.72 In effect, this provides us with the prospect of something like
a “third way,”73 between legalism and populism; between “legalistic
nitpicking”74 (legitimate constitutional change can only take place via
Article V) and “lawless force”75 (constitutional law means nothing in the
face of contrary public opinion). To put this differently and perhaps more
clearly, one could say that the promise of popular sovereignty is defended
in Ackerman’s work against two opposing threats: (1) the threat of the
“bicentennial myth,”76 which denies that Americans have meaningfully
reinvented their constitutional identity since the 1780s, thereby confining
the American experience of popular sovereignty and political freedom to
the very distant past, and (2) the threat of the populist demagogue who
claims that their solid electoral mandate justifies all manner of
69. Schmitt’s distinction between the “absolute” and “relative” conceptions of a constitution is
an important example of this, SCHMITT, supra note 10, but Ackerman finds more palatable support
from the American founders, including in Alexander Hamilton’s claim in Federalist No. 78 that the
“power of the people is superior to” the power of government, see Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1013 (1984).
70. ARATO, supra note 16, at 23.
71. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 182.
72. Andrew Arato has offered a very different reading of Ackerman, suggesting that Ackerman’s
theory only emphasizes the separation of powers during periods of normal politics, not during periods
of constitutional politics when the People themselves begin to speak. While there is a certain amount
of rhetoric in Ackerman’s work that supports this reading, it is undercut, I would argue, by Ackerman’s
explicit claims that it is a reform movement’s slow passage through the American separation of powers
that will eventually vindicate its bold claims to speak for the People. As Ackerman writes in The Civil
Rights Revolution, for example, a reform movement must “undertake an arduous march through the
presidency, Congress, and the Court before it can legitimately enact sweeping changes.” See
Ackerman, supra note 31, at 43. For Arato’s analysis, see ARATO, supra note 16, at 108.
73. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 33.
74. See Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 63, 86 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
75. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 116.
76. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 34.
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constitutional novelty. In response to these opposing threats, Ackerman
gives us a fascinating and auspicious hybrid: namely, the idea that the
sovereign People should be regarded as speaking when a majority of the
voting population keeps speaking, and keeps lending its support for
the same initiative over a sustained period of time and after a rich sequence
of highly public debates. The question now on the table is: how does
the prospect of court-packing generally and, in 2021 in particular, look
when viewed through the lens of Ackerman’s hybrid theory of
constitutional change?
II. OPTION ONE: COURT-PACKING AS A MOVE TO CONSOLIDATE A
CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT?
Having cast our eyes back over Ackerman’s constitutional theory,
then, let us turn back to the matter at hand by asking whether that theory
allows court-packing to be treated as a democratically defensible pathway
to systemic change. While Ackerman does not offer an unequivocal
answer to this question, his thoughtful engagement with President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR) infamous court-packing plan in Volume II of
We the People provides some important clues on his thinking, and will
accordingly serve as a useful starting point in framing Ackerman’s
perspective on court-packing as a road to constitutional amendment
outside Article V.77 Without delving too deep into the well-worn story of
the FDR plan,78 suffice it to say here that the plan came within sight of
fruition when Roosevelt won his second presidential election in 1936,
when he maintained his office with one of the most decisive, sweeping
mandates in American history.79 From the outset, this already tells us
77. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 312–44.
78. On this story, see also JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE
SUPREME COURT (2011), and William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
“Court-Packing” Plan, SUP. CT. REV. 347 (1966).
79. This is an understatement. As Ackerman explained in an earlier law review article, what
distinguishes FDR and the New Deal Democrats from subsequent reformers (like Reagan’s
Republicans) is the way that the former continued to accumulate support with each election,
culminating in their blunt obliteration of the opposition in 1936. To quote Ackerman on this:
Before Franklin Roosevelt gained the Senate’s advice and consent to transformative
appointments, he did more than simply win reelection. Most obviously, he led the
Democratic Party to a remarkable series of electoral victories in Congress. Looking
narrowly at the Senate, the difference between the Roosevelt and Reagan years does not
show up so dramatically on the day each President first took possession of the White
House: in both 1932 and 1980, the President’s party took control of the Senate for the first
time in many years (fourteen years in the case of the Democrats, twenty-six in the case of
the Republicans). The key difference is that Roosevelt succeeded, and Reagan failed, to
build on this initial success. During Reagan’s first six years, Republican support in the
Senate remained in the low 50’s, and finally sank to minority status in 1986, despite the
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something crucial about how to read Ackerman’s views on the FDR plan,
because if Ackerman is anything less than resounding in his recognition
of FDR’s democratic authority to pack the Supreme Court after
a second, crushing electoral victory (and as we will see, he is far
from resounding on this count), then does it not seem that from his
perspective, court-packing is a governmental option to be justified
extremely hesitantly, if ever?
Keeping this thought closely in mind, we can pick up the story by
recalling that although FDR’s plan suffered a massive defeat at the hands
of an otherwise friendly80 Congress, it is also seen as having provoked the
Supreme Court’s repudiation of the Lochner era81 in West Coast Hotel, the
infamous “switch in time that saved nine”82 and that ended the Supreme
Court’s long, bitter resistance to the New Deal. How does Ackerman view
this chain of events? The first thing to note is that, on his reading, the
switch occurred toward the tail end of a period of intense constitutional
politics, after the constitutional philosophy of the New Deal had already
cleared an impressive succession of electoral hurdles and was for
Ackerman on the brink of yielding a completed constitutional moment. In
this regard, one may initially suppose that by 1937, the Supreme Court
was increasingly unjustified, from a dualist point of view, in its
institutional resistance. Did the increasing gulf between enduring public
opinion and the Supreme Court’s Lochner jurisprudence give Roosevelt a
right to use a tactic as contentious and drastic as court-packing to
constitutionally entrench the New Deal?
Not quite, as it turns out. Or at least, things are not as simple as saying
in advance that court-packing is simply right or wrong, legitimate or
illegitimate, thinkable or unthinkable. On the contrary, for Ackerman, the
thinker of the constituent power in modern America,83 everything hinges
on how ordinary Americans, the distinctive “heroes”84 of Ackerman’s
President’s warning about the fate of future Supreme Court nominees. In contrast, the New
Deal Democrats kept building their representation to unprecedented heights during the next
two elections—so that, after their landslide victory of 1936, there were no fewer than
seventy-six Democrats in the Senate.
Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1173.
80. As noted in the footnote above, “there were no fewer than seventy-six Democrats in the
Senate” when FDR put forward his court-packing plan. Id.
81. For an especially interesting and thoughtful analysis of the Lochner-era and its modern-day
descendants, see Cass Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987); see also Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
82. See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
69, 69 (2010); see also KENT ROACH: THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR
DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE? 19 (2001).
83. As an example of this claim, see Andrew Arato, Carl Schmitt and the Revival of the Doctrine
of the Constituent Power in the United States, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1739 (2000).
84. See Christodoulidis, supra note 29, at 969.
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theory, would have responded to court-packing if it had been successfully
implemented. In this sense, while a large majority of Americans went with
Roosevelt in 1936 despite being warned that court-packing could be on the
horizon (e.g., by FDR’s opponent, Alf Landon85), this does not tell us how
voters would have reacted to court-packing as a definitive occurrence
rather than an uncertain prospect. Indeed, when the Supreme Court
eventually undertook its famous switch in time, it effectively “killed” 86
what Ackerman refers to as a “remarkably sophisticated constitutional
debate”87 over whether “unconventional steps like court-packing”88 would
suffice to enact decisive constitutional change or whether reformists
would ultimately need to take a much longer and more precarious walk
home through Article V. What a shame, Ackerman seems to sigh, that we
will never know how voters would have responded to and weighed in on
this debate.89 This is especially so insofar as early Gallup polling suggested
that public opinion was swinging in Roosevelt’s favor before the switch,
although it was still very much on a knife edge (as Ackerman says, “on the
eve of the Court’s ‘switch,’ Gallup was reporting a close division of
opinion”90). Would “continued judicial resistance . . . have played into [the
President’s] hands, allowing him to present court-packing as the only
practical solution”91 to the problem of a staunchly “intransigent”92 and
unpopular Supreme Court?
We need not answer this question. On the contrary, the most
important question for the purposes of this Article is one that I have
already answered: the question of whether court-packing could have been
a democratically acceptable means of consolidating the constitutional
transformations of the New Deal. Ackerman’s answer to this question, as
we have seen, is that it would have depended on how the American public
weighed in on Roosevelt’s legacy at the next election, after the President
had successfully pushed his packing plan through Congress. Without
overstating things, then, Ackerman’s emphasis on popular sovereignty as
a redemptive force renders court-packing ultimately thinkable, but
conditionally so, where ordinary voters actually show their clear support
for its executors via electoral politics. This is why I suggested above that
court-packing is not simply right or wrong, legitimate or illegitimate,
thinkable or unthinkable. To put it simply, the legitimacy of court-packing
85. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 310.
86. Id. at 315.
87. Id. at 314.
88. Id. at 315.
89. Id. at 314–15.
90. Id. at 333.
91. Id. at 335.
92. Id.
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and of similar practices is, in Ackerman’s view, a question of political
history, of how the country happens to sway in the winds of opposing
constitutional arguments and extraordinary institutional actions.
To flash forward to the impending future, does this mean that
court-packing in 2021 could be retroactively legitimated if it were
followed, say, by a Democratic landslide in the 2022 midterms and by
even more landslides further down the road? The answer to this question
ultimately depends on how we read Ackerman. On one reading, it may
seem that Ackerman’s theory withholds judgment from early efforts to
represent a People (acts of “creative statesmanship”93), and allows all such
efforts to be validated or invalidated by public opinion over time, even if
they are rightly questionable and hence contestable when they initially
take place. However, a much better reading, I think, would take account
of Ackerman’s comments on another democratically questionable
strategy, the use of the ordinary judicial appointments process to radically
and quickly transform constitutional law (à la FDR after the failure of his
packing plan). On this tactic, Ackerman argues fervently in the closing
pages of We the People: Transformations that later Presidents should—
for reasons of political strategy94 as well as reasons of dualistic political
morality—be far more cautious than FDR when appointing new justices,
assuming that subsequent presidents (especially in these times of extreme
political polarization95) will lack the type of mandate that FDR had when
he made his boldest appointments to the court.96 To quote one of the key
passages in this section:
Nonetheless, the New Deal precedent . . . [of transformative
appointments following the failure of court-packing] . . . may be
abused by future Presidents with far more equivocal mandates than
Roosevelt’s. After all, each President’s power to influence the Court
depends on the vagaries of death and resignation. A significant
number of vacancies may open up during the term(s) of an
ideological President who lacks broad and deep support. Given the
ease with which Senatorial confirmation battles can obscure the
93. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 44.
94. For Ackerman, there is a high risk that “interbranch struggle” over a contentious judicial
appointment may “only reveal the shallowness of . . . [the President’s public and Congressional]
support.” ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 395.
95. See Divided America, ASSOCIATED PRESS, https://www.ap.org/explore/divided-america/
index.html [https://perma.cc/V4LX-KJFN].
96. To quote Ackerman:
Most Presidents do not come into office with a mandate for fundamental change of the kind
that Franklin Delano Roosevelt plausibly claimed in the aftermath of the elections of
1936 . . . If the American people were ever endorsing a break with their constitutional past,
they were doing so in the 1930’s.
ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 53.
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underlying issues, it is just too easy for randomly selected Presidents
to revolutionize constitutional law without the kind of popular
support required in dualist theory.97

The message here is quite clear, but Ackerman was even clearer in a
1988 law review article on the idea of “transformative”98 judicial
appointments. In that piece, Ackerman suggested that the use of the
appointments process to transform the Supreme Court is actually a “bad
thing,”99 even if it has some advantages over the Article V process and
even if there is in reality “no going back to the good old days when
[A]rticle V provided the only means by which Americans debated changes
in their constitutional destiny.”100 This does not mean that Roosevelt was
overreaching when he eventually “packed”101 the Court via the
appointments process (Ackerman’s inclusion of the New Deal as a
legitimate constitutional moment makes this crystal clear102); just that the
appointments process does not have checks baked into it that would
prevent a President with a much thinner mandate from seizing the court in
a relatively short space of time and, from speaking for the People before
their full, constitutional will has materialized (before the People have
appeared, one might even say103).
It is hard to miss the parallels between these moments of warning
from Ackerman and the current situation in the United States, where
happenstance has indeed given a President who lost the popular vote by a
significant margin two very consequential Supreme Court picks in his first
term. Putting these parallels to one side, the deeper implication for present
purposes is that while sustained popularity across a generation can serve
to validate, vindicate, or “perfect”104 controversial tactics retroactively (or
as Publius put it, to “blot out . . . irregularities”105) from a dualist
perspective, Ackerman also seems to believe that there are limits—albeit
effervescent, uncertain and context-sensitive ones—with respect to when
97. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 405.
98. See Ackerman, supra note 11.
99. Id. at 1179.
100. Id.
101. I do not mean to suggest here that this method of packing is the same, morally, as passing
a law that enlarges the court and transforms it in one fell swoop. On the contrary, as FDR’s
Congressional opponents—in his own party—made clear, there is something far less problematic and
altogether more “orderly” about piecemeal, incremental packing through the appointments process,
presumably since it provides opportunities for opposition movements to interrupt a transformative
President’s progress. Id. at 1176.
102. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 105–30.
103. One may well say this under Ackerman’s influence. As he puts it in the first volume of We
the People, under normal political conditions (as opposed to periods of constitutional politics), “the
People simply do not exist.” Id. at 263.
104. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 93.
105. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 174.
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certain tactics can be used. In effect, the overarching rule from which such
limits can be derived is that bolder, more morally or legally dubious tactics
should be reserved for the closing phases of an unfolding constitutional
moment, when the public has already given support for an initiative
repeatedly but are still seeing their emergent and almost fully emerged
voice thwarted by a group of constitutionally conservative institutions that
did not get the memo. In this sense, rather than viewing Ackerman’s theory
as one that grants legitimacy only in hindsight, one may view it as turning
on something like a “two-tiered”106 legitimacy test that requires first that
there is a strong measure of proportionality between the boldness of the
tactic used and the progress of the constitutional moment and, second, that
all tactics used by reformers are validated by the repeated expressions of
public support required to constitute a full-fledged constitutional moment.
III. OPTION TWO: COURT-PACKING AS A CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNAL?
So, this is how Ackerman discusses the most famous and infamous
episode of attempted court-packing in American history. While this
analysis can surely help us understand Ackerman’s general perspective on
the political morality of court-packing, FDR’s position was strikingly
different from the position that a Democratic President might hope to find
themselves in come 2021, not least of all because there is no Democratic
constitutional moment currently underway to be consolidated and because
the chances of a Democratic landslide are grievously slim (America is now

106. In effect, my proposal here comes close to but modifies the following test attributed to
Ackerman in an I-CONnect blog entry:
Ackerman accepts the legitimacy of popular, extra-legal changes to constitutional law, but
in a very precise, non-populist way that gives rise to a two-tiered legitimacy test. To
explain: when the use of formal amendment procedures is problematic, it is presumed that
political and legal actors may legitimately act outside of or stretch pre-existing laws to
publicize an emergent movement to reorient national values (as the Warren Court did, for
example, with its Brown decision). At one level, Ackerman’s theory regards such action as
legitimate, since it promotes republican debate over national values (essential for the
production of constitutional moments). However, at another level, Ackerman’s theory also
regards such action as illegitimate—or rather, as not-yet-legitimate—because responsible
actors can not yet claim to be acting in the name of “the people,” only in the name of a
budding popular will that they aim, precisely, to let/make bloom.
Richard Mailey, Weak-Form Judicial Review as a Way of Legally Facilitating Constitutional
Moments?, INT’L J. CONST. L. I-CONNECT BLOG (Feb. 22, 2018) (emphasis added), http://www.
iconnectblog.com/2018/02/weak-form-judicial-review-as-a-way-of-legally-facilitating-constitutional
-moments/ [https://perma.cc/4DPC-LPEN]. My modification to this formulation is that I do not
believe that all legally or morally questionable acts are equal when it comes to meeting the first tier of
the test. Rather, my sense is that there is a proportionality component in Ackerman’s thinking, which
allows for bolder and more controversial action the closer a constitutional moment is to completion—
especially where recalcitrant conservative branches are digging their heels in despite an enduring
public appetite for change.
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too polarized for a landslide in any direction107). This leaves us to ask, in
the remainder of the Article: is there anything more specific that
Ackerman’s theory suggests about the potential legitimacy of courtpacking in 2021? Are Democrats doomed to wait until they have
repeatedly claimed FDR-level mandates before considering an option like
court-packing? In other words, from the perspective of Ackerman’s
dualism, would a popular succession of Democratic governments have to
watch more or less passively, and haplessly, while their boldest (and from
their perspective most essential) legal reforms get scuppered by an
arguably108 illegitimate Supreme Court for years to come?
In the next two sections, I will move us closer to answering these
questions by considering two ways in which court-packing might yet be
defended in 2021 using Ackerman’s model of constitutional amendment.
To begin with, in this section, I will consider whether court-packing in
2021 could be framed as what Ackerman calls a constitutional signal. As
already noted, a constitutional signal is the first, initiating step in
Ackerman’s “alternative signaling system”109 of constitutional
amendment, where an institution of the federal government translates the
pleas of a social movement for constitutional transformation into a
deliberately contra-constitutional act, e.g., a law that cuts clearly against
the “constitutional status quo.”110 While the third volume of Ackerman’s
We the People trilogy suggests that this act can come from any branch of
government, including the Supreme Court, I will focus my attention here
on the executive-led approach that appears in the first volume of We the
People and which Ackerman has affirmed as recently as 2014.111
As presented in We the People’s first volume, Ackerman’s signaling
test proposes that an ideal constitutional signal will possess three key
characteristics. First, it will be issued by a “plebiscitarian” 112 leader who
can plausibly “claim a mandate from the People.”113 Second, it will be
legally solidified by being submitted to and approved by Congress in the
107. See, e.g., Divided America, supra note 95.
108. See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4.
109. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 278.
110. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 418.
111. For Ackerman’s recent affirmation of this test, see Bruce Ackerman, De-Schooling
Constitutional Law, 123 YALE L.J. 3104, 3110 (2014).
112. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 83.
113. Id. at 268. Although Ackerman uses the term “People” with a capital P here, I would suggest
that his theory disallows such claims in the early phases of the higher lawmaking process. As he puts
it, “no institution of normal politics can be allowed to transubstantiate itself into the People.” Id. at
182. This suggests that what Ackerman really means to say here, when he suggests that the President
must have a mandate from the People, is that the President should have a mandate from the electorate,
or the population of voters. To say any more than this in the signaling phase is surely to rely on the
type of “naive synecdoche” that Ackerman rejects when he formulates his dialogic, protracted model
for recognizing acts of popular sovereignty. Id. at 183.
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form of a “transformative statute that challenge[s] . . . the fundamentals of
the preexisting regime.”114 And third, the reform initiative itself will
have a level of public support, over and above the President’s personal
mandate, that is “extraordinary in three senses: depth, breadth,
and decisiveness.”115 While the first two of these three requirements are
straightforward, the third requirement is more complex and merits distinct
consideration. What, then, does Ackerman mean by deep, broad, and
decisive public support?
Beginning with depth, Ackerman suggests that a reform initiative
will have deep support when a supportive individual has “deliberated as
much about her commitment to . . . [it] as she thinks appropriate in making
a considered judgment on an important decision in her private life.”116
Although it is surely difficult, if not impossible, to determine the extent of
such support across a large population, Ackerman nonetheless opts to put
a loose figure on this requirement by suggesting that a legitimate
constitutional signal must possess the deep support of around 20% of
the voting population.117 The conditions of breadth and decisiveness
then require, respectively, that an additional 31% of the population support
the relevant initiative on less considered but basically non-selfish grounds
(as Ackerman puts it, “numbers count”118), and that the initiative is
“in a position to defeat all the plausible alternatives in a series of
pairwise comparisons.”119
Taken together, these requirements seem to place some rather steep
limits on an initiative’s admission to what Ackerman calls the “higher
lawmaking”120 track. For several reasons, though, Ackerman suggests that
the requirements should not be applied too stringently. The first reason for
this suggestion is that Ackerman supposes that little harm will be done by
accepting the legitimacy of an under supported signal, given that such a
signal will be highly unlikely to “survive the obstacle course that awaits
on the higher lawmaking track (though of course, nothing is certain in
politics).”121 Second, Ackerman suggests that imposing overly strict limits
on acts of signaling will risk “betray[ing] . . . the Constitution’s
114. Id. at 268. I should note that Ackerman technically places this step in the subsequent
“proposal” phase of a constitutional moment, but the two phases—signaling and proposing—are
sufficiently intertwined, I think, to justify its inclusion here as a key aspect of constitutional signaling.
115. Id. at 272.
116. Id. at 274.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 277.
120. The higher lawmaking track is the sequence of tests that an initiative must pass to be
counted as a constitutional amendment outside Article V under Ackerman’s theory (i.e., as a
constitutional moment). Id.
121. Id. at 280.
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foundational commitment to popular sovereignty”122 by depriving citizens
of the opportunity to reconsider, “on appropriate occasions” 123 and in everchanging ways, the terms of their constitutional co-existence (his broader
argument is of course that this is what Article V has problematically
tended to do). “Worse yet,” Ackerman writes:
[blocking reform movements too quickly] . . . will alienate the
movement’s many partisans from the ongoing process of
government. These people will not passively accept the fact that the
door to higher lawmaking has been slammed in their face. If existing
institutions refuse to hear the voice of the People, they will be
tempted to take more radical steps to gain the center of the political
stage—abandoning entirely the higher lawmaking structures
intended to organize the debate and seeking more violent and elitist
forms of fundamental change.124

This passage comes at the end of the section of Ackerman’s first We
the People book on constitutional signaling, and it may leave one
wondering if the requirement of deep, broad, and decisive support is more
a flexible preference for Ackerman than a rule. Does this suggest that
Supreme Court expansion could, from an Ackermanian perspective, be
defensibly undertaken in 2021 by a supportive President and Congress if
it had a mere preponderance of public support (or at least a bit less public
support than the “extraordinary”125 levels preferred by Ackerman)? To
begin addressing this question, recall that the core justification for
Ackerman’s alternative lawmaking system is that it is distinguishable from
“demagogic lawlessness and populism”126 even though it involves
bypassing legal norms in the name of popular sovereignty (a populist
gesture, par excellence). To achieve this distinction, the Ackermanian
alternative lawmaking system relies heavily on what Claude Lefort calls
the “institutionalization of conflict.”127 The President issues a
constitutional signal, but the layered structure of the American system
leaves ample room for other institutions and actors (e.g., the Supreme

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 191. “[A] constitutional road to the people, ought to be marked out, and kept open,
for certain great and extraordinary occasions.” Id. (emphasis added).
126. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 4 (2011).
127. Claude Lefort, The Permanence of the Theologico-Political?, in POLITICAL THEOLOGIES:
PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN A POST-SECULAR WORLD 160–61 (Hent De Vries & Lawrence E. Sullivan eds.,
2006).
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Court) to strike back by defending a more “conservative”128 constitutional
vision. The problem is, court-packing does not allow for this conflictual,
Lefortian dynamic. On the contrary, the decisive function (if not the
purpose) of court-packing in 2021 would be precisely to remove the final
bastion of institutional resistance to Democratic reform, thereby
homogenizing the upper echelons of the federal government or, at the very
least, watering down the Supreme Court’s capacity to present a
conservative alternative to a budding Democratic reform movement.129
A Democrat might respond to this argument by noting that while
court-packing (or expansion) would certainly change the likelihood that
the Supreme Court would pose a meaningful challenge to the
transformative impulses of a Democratic government, it would leave
another key site of resistance, the Republican Party, untouched and ready
to fight back at the next election. Of course, in a very broad sense, the
potential for Republican resistance does interrupt the monologic, antiLefortian thrust of court-packing, because if court-packing was pursued in
a new administration’s first term, it would likely only come to pass within
sight of the midterm elections, thereby giving voters an opportunity to
promptly penalize Democrats if they perceive overreach, or if they
otherwise reject their governmental vision. However, while electoral
politics is an important aspect of the Ackermanian model, the rather more
decisive, legitimating dynamic is the inter-institutional one at the federal
level. Indeed, according to Ackerman, it is precisely this dynamic that sets
the dualism of the American system most sharply against the “levelling
democracy”130 or “monism”131 of the UK, “where a single election can
indeed generate dramatic changes.”132 In this sense, the crucial point for
Ackerman is that a scheme of tectonic change in America should not just
be tested by its proponents’ reelection prospects but by a meaningfully
robust separation of powers as well, i.e., by the need for reformers to
“undertake an arduous march through the presidency, Congress, and the
128. As Ackerman explains in relation to the Supreme Court’s role during the New Deal, for
example: “[T]he Supreme Court [during the New Deal] was contributing to the American people’s
political education by presenting a rich constitutional critique revealing the extent to which the New
Deal’s innovations could be seen as departing from our nation’s traditional political principles.”
Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1174.
129. See Arato, supra note 1.
130. To quote Ackerman on the notion of “levelling” democracy: “In this single-track view,
there is only one place in which the political will of the American people is to be found: the Congress
of the United States. If the Congress enacts a law, the People have spoken; if not, not. It’s that simple
. . . .” Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1035–37 (1984).
131. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453,
464 (1989).
132. ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 43.
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Court,”133 before their initiative can finally be admitted to the country’s
constitutional canon.
To be clear, though, none of these arguments negate the potential
legitimacy of a Democratic constitutional signal in 2021 along other lines.
From an Ackermanian perspective, a successful signal and proposal could
be issued, depending on the level and quality of public support for it, in
the form of a statute that consciously contravenes and challenges previous
Supreme Court rulings on critical issues like campaign finance (Citizens
United134) or gun control (Heller135).136 However, for Ackerman, the value
of such moves is not that they would necessarily facilitate positive
constitutional reform but that they would provoke national and interinstitutional dialogue on the relevant issues, thereby creating a space for
ordinary Americans—the distinctive deciders within Ackerman’s
theory—to ultimately determine over the course of the next generation if
the time for change has arrived. While it may be tempting for Democrats
to avoid this “arduous”137 and precariously uncertain process of
consensus-building, Ackerman’s theory regards such a process as nonnegotiable where the informal amendment track is being used, and for
good reasons. Above all, the most important reason for this requirement is
that the key role of the federal separation of powers as a way to
“stagger”138 reform processes is really the most significant factor (as noted
in Section I) that separates Ackerman from populist constitutionalists like
Carl Schmitt139 as well as from the authoritarian populism of Poland’s
court-packing Law and Justice Party. In the end, everything—all the
institutionalist, dialogic, non-populist legitimacy that Ackerman’s
theory claims to capture—hinges on the strength of this distinction, and
on the extent to which Ackerman joins the likes of Claude Lefort rather
than the likes of Schmitt. The problem is that for the reasons
just mentioned, one cannot sustain this distinction while casting courtpacking as a constitutional signal. This realization leads us now to our third
and final opportunity to stage an Ackermanian defense of court-packing
in the next section.

133. Id.
134. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
135. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
136. For a comprehensive survey of the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence, see LAURENCE TRIBE &
JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014).
137. ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 43.
138. Id.
139. See generally SCHMITT, supra note 10.
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IV. OPTION THREE: COURT-PACKING AS AN EXPRESSION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM?
So, court-packing in 2021 is hard to frame as a constitutional signal
under Ackerman’s theory. Is there another way of framing it, though, that
would more decisively separate the Democrats from authoritarian populist
court-packers like the Law and Justice Party in Poland140 and populist
constitutional theorists like Carl Schmitt141? In this Section, I will offer an
affirmative answer to this question by casting Democrats in a completely
new (and extremely limited) constitutional role, namely, the role of
constitutional conservatives rather than reformers. In its most distilled
form, the essence of this argument is that even if a single set of electoral
wins would not give Democrats anything like a mandate to begin exacting
constitutional change via transformative court-packing (or even via
the appointments process142) in 2021, it would give Democrats a
mandate—and a constitutional obligation, one may even argue—to
swiftly and decisively curb the transformative agenda that is currently
being pursued by Republicans via eminently controversial uses of the
appointments process.
In making this argument, I will address two key questions. Firstly,
on what precise Ackermanian grounds could Democrats challenge the
transformative efforts of the Republican party? And secondly, what kind
of court-packing or reform initiative would this challenge permit or
require? Beginning with the first question, the crucial point is that
Ackerman’s theory requires that constitutional reform attempts outside
Article V enjoy the consistent support of ordinary Americans across a full
generation—with no major breaks or hiccups.143 In this regard, while a
Democratic President and Congress may well believe that the current
President’s failure to win the popular vote in 2016 delegitimated his
scheme of transformative judicial appointments from the outset, their main
140. See Sadurski, supra note 2.
141. See generally SCHMITT, supra note 10.
142. There is an important distinction to be made here between ordinary and transformative uses
of the appointments process. In a 1988 law review article on the idea of “transformative
appointments,” Ackerman compares two Reagan appointments: Bork and O’Connor. Ackerman,
supra note 11. Of these two, only Bork—who of course was not confirmed—counts for Ackerman as
a transformative appointment, partly because of his intellectual prowess (and his related potential to
lead the right wing of the court across a generation), partly because of his comparatively extreme
views (by contrast, O’Connor was a moderate with conservative leanings), and partly because his
views were so clearly documented (hence acting as a “signal” to the country of what a Justice Bork
would look like in practice). See id. at 1169–70.
143. Note, for example, that one of the crucial differences that Ackerman stresses between the
transformative efforts of FDR and Reagan is that unlike FDR, Reagan failed to build on his initial
success by winning more commanding electoral victories or, at the very least, by maintaining control
of Congress. See id. at 1173.
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Ackermanian argument as constitutional conservatives would be that any
mandate that the Republicans may or may not have had to pursue
constitutional transformation post-2016 would have then been decisively
terminated by their failure to win critical elections in 2020.
From the outset, it is worth noting that this argument has the
debatable benefit of bypassing a range of divisive issues, including, for
example, the controversial appointment of Brett Kavanaugh to the
Supreme Court.144 To explain this point, while the current President’s
mandate (or lack thereof) poses a significant problem for the dualistic
legitimacy of Justice Kavanaugh’s nomination, dualism is less directly
concerned with either the allegations surrounding Justice Kavanaugh’s
past conduct or the conspiratorial rhetoric of his confirmation hearings.145
Of course, these factors are gravely and rightly important from a broader
political and moral perspective, but recall that we are confining ourselves
for now to an engagement with Ackerman’s dualist theory of
constitutional transformation, and recall further that this theory allows
enduring and dialogically tested public support for constitutional change
to “blot out”146 or “perfect”147 defects in the amendment process. The
question is: could the problematic appointment of Justice Kavanaugh be
counted as a potentially excusable defect in the Republicans’ quest for
constitutional change, i.e., excusable by an eventual manifestation of
popular sovereignty in the Republicans’ favor? In lieu of a simple answer
to this question, suffice it to say that although more dubious or aggressive
tactics should be deployed later in the amendment process under
Ackerman’s model, Ackerman’s emphasis on the redemptive force of
popular sovereignty suggests quite clearly that a backward-looking
approach—one that re-litigates the Kavanaugh affair—is not most
effective Ackermanian argument for conservative or defensive courtpacking. On the contrary, if the Democrats win big in 2020, their principal
Ackermanian argument would be that Republican reformists had been
democratically repudiated and should have their constitutional gains
reversed via “remedial” changes to the Supreme Court. To paraphrase
none other than President Trump on this point, one could say that, from an

144. On the Kavanaugh hearings and the various controversies surrounding them, see generally
Tribe, supra note 6. See also Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4, at 159–60.
145. See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4, at 158–60.
146. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 174 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison)).
147. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 93. As noted previously, here Ackerman analogizes
an adverse possessor—who perfects his initially poor title to land by complying with certain
legal conditions over time—to a constitutional reform movement aiming to bring about a
constitutional moment.
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Ackermanian perspective, the “only important thing is the . . . people,”148
and it is the people—and not just those who are understandably appalled
by Kavanaugh’s confirmation149—who must choose whether to finally and
firmly reject the Republicans’ transformative constitutional vision.
As narrow as this argument might seem, there are still a lot of
variables on which its success depends. In particular, the success of this
argument hinges on how fully Democrats would be willing to invest
themselves in the Ackermanian role of constitutional conservatives, which
would depend, in turn, on the specific contours of their court reform
package and on the aggressiveness with which they would pursue
nationally controversial elements of their political agenda. To make this
point clearer, let us very briefly consider each of these two factors in turn,
starting with the court reform package itself.
What kind of reform (or “packing”) package would allow the
Democrats to cast themselves as constitutional conservatives? The easy
but negative answer to this is of course that the Democrats could not do
anything that could be reasonably mistaken for stacking the deck in their
favor, but this answer simply leaves us to ask again: what could they do?
One of the most interesting answers to this question has come from
presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg, whose “Balanced Bench”150
proposal is based on a recent article in the Yale Law Journal.151 To quote
an explanatory passage from that article:
The . . . [Balanced Bench] proposal has several components. First,
the Supreme Court would start with ten justices. Five would be
affiliated with the Democratic Party, and five with the Republican
Party. These ten justices would then select five additional Justices
chosen from current circuit (or possibly district) court judges. The
catch? The ten partisan-affiliated Justices would need to select the
additional five Justices unanimously (or at least a strong
supermajority requirement). These additional five Justices would be
chosen two years in advance, for one-year terms. And if the Justices
148. See MÜLLER, supra note 1, at 22. As Müller points out, though, the current President has a
very different understanding of what constitutes a “people,” as evidenced by the full quote that I have
paraphrased above: “[T]he only important thing is the unification of the people—because the other
people don’t mean anything.” Id. As this quote suggests, the President, and populists generally, has
little or no interest in social groups and individuals that cannot be brought to share their moral and
political vision (i.e., that cannot be “unified” behind that vision). See id.
149. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 6; see also Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4.
150. See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4, at 193–205. While Epps and Sitaraman offer a second
proposal on “how to save the Supreme Court” (“the Supreme Court Lottery”), I am only considering
the “Balanced Bench” plan because it was the plan that was originally embraced by Buttigieg and that,
according to the Mother Jones article cited earlier, brought court-packing onto the table as a serious
option for the Democrats if they win big enough in 2020. See Levy, supra note 3.
151. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4.
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failed to agree on a slate of additional colleagues, the Supreme Court
would lack a quorum and could not hear any cases for that year.152

On its face, this plan evidently aspires to attain an ideological
equilibrium on the Supreme Court, and this arguably renders it more
plausible as a public-regarding, non-partisan project, i.e., as a
constitutionally conservative project of the type considered here.
However, there are troubling questions (in what way would justices be
“partisan-affiliated”?153) as well as constitutional objections (e.g., relying
on the Appointments Clause154) that could be thrown at such a plan, as
recognized by the plan’s authors and as raised, more forcefully, by various
others.155 Curiously, to the extent that these objections hold water, it seems
that while partisan and indeed populist court-packing is constitutionally
sound and legal, Buttigieg’s sincere proposal to balance the Supreme
Court may require an Article V amendment (as would equally admirable
efforts to limit the power of the Court156). These constitutional
152. Id. at 193.
153. See Jamelle Bouie, Opinion, Why Pete Buttigieg Is Wrong About the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES (June 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/06/opinion/buttigieg-warren-supremecourt.html [https://perma.cc/J89J-TAG7]. On this question, Epps and Sitaraman indicate in their
original article that the best option would likely be if “partisan-affiliated” judges were chosen by
representatives of the two main parties or by a bipartisan commission, but there are numerous
questions that this leaves very insistently and problematically hanging, most notably the question of
who gets the phenomenal and hugely consequential power to choose judges on behalf of their party
(and the related question of how their empowerment can be justified). See Epps & Sitaraman, supra
note 4.
154. See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4, at 200–05. Epps and Sitaraman have recently offered
another response to these constitutional objections in Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, The
Constitutionality of the 5-5-5 Plan, TAKE CARE BLOG (May 17, 2019), https://takecareblog.com/blog
/the-constitutionality-of-the-5-5-5-supreme-court-plan [https://perma.cc/S39D-N9AS]. However, as
well argued as they are, their various responses do not overcome the fact that their plan is
constitutionally controversial and would be likely to generate substantial backlash, both institutionally
and socially.
155. See Aaron Belkin, 5-5-5 and Appellate Rotation Plans Are Unconstitutional and
Unworkable, TAKE BACK THE COURT (Mar. 2019), https://www.takebackthecourt.today/5-5-5-andappellate-rotation-plans-are-unconstitutional-and-unworkable [https://perma.cc/Z9J5-U4KJ]; see also
Stephen E. Sachs, Supreme Court as Superweapon: A Response to Epps and Sitaraman, 129 YALE
L.J.F. 93 (2019), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/supreme-court-as-superweapon [https://
perma.cc/27LK-TJS2].
156. For an example of efforts to limit the Court’s power by constitutionalizing a “weak-form”
model of judicial review, see generally Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of
Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001). The example of this approach that seems to be bestknown globally is the Canadian notwithstanding clause, which allows Canadian legislatures (both
federal and provincial) to override judicial decisions on certain constitutional rights for renewable
five-year periods. From an Ackermanian perspective, the problem with such an approach is that it
allows for kneejerk responses to unpopular court decisions rather than responses reflecting a more
enduring, dialogically tested rejection of those decisions on the part of the public. With this pitfall in
mind, one may accordingly wonder if the constitutional amendment proposed by Senator Burton
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implications create a potent problem for the Buttigieg plan and other
similarly creative or unconventional plans. Assuming that Article V is not
an option (and current divisions suggest that it is probably not), one is left
wondering if the idea would be to try get the plan through Congress despite
credible claims of constitutional infirmity, thereby damaging the
Democrats’ self-presentation as constitutional conservatives and
potentially also precipitating a constitutional crisis by leaving the Supreme
Court to decide whether to block or permit its own reform. Is there a way
out of this impasse, a way forward that does not raise constitutional red
flags or look like partisan court-packing, both of which would erode the
Democrats’ claims of constitutional conservatism?
A perhaps disappointing way around this problem could be for
Democrats to couple a modest form of court-packing—“court-balancing,”
let’s call it157—with various forms of self-limitation. Assuming, then, that
changing the Supreme Court’s composition is the only strategy that could
not attract reasonable constitutional scrutiny, consider the following two
scenarios as possible Ackermanian pathways to conservative courtpacking in 2021. For the first scenario, suppose that a Democrat decisively
ousts Trump in 2020 and sets to work not by lobbying a new, blue majority
Congress to stack the Supreme Court decisively in their favor but by
advocating the “balancing” addition of a tenth Justice. Anticipating
Republican and voter backlash as a response to even this modest and fully
legal reform, suppose further that Congress sets the effective date for the
law after the midterms to give the American public—the “ordinary
Americans” who hold the keys to the Constitution under Ackerman’s
theory—an opportunity to at least have a say on whether the fresh
Wheeler, as an alternative to FDR’s court-packing plan, would be a more dualist way of limiting the
court’s power. The key part of this proposed amendment states:
In case the Supreme Court renders any judgment holding any Act of
Congress . . . unconstitutional, the question with respect to the constitutionality of such Act
or provision shall be promptly submitted to the Congress for its action at the earliest
practicable date that the Congress is in session . . . but no action shall be taken by the
Congress upon such question until an election shall have been held at which Members of
the House of Representatives are regularly by law to be chosen. If such Act or provision is
re-enacted by two-thirds of each House of the Congress . . . such Act or provision shall be
deemed to be constitutional and effective from the date of such reenactment.
ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 321 (emphasis added).
157. As Epps and Sitaraman point out in their article, Eric Segall has cogently defended the idea
that the Supreme Court should be “permanently and evenly divided along partisan and ideological
lines” (e.g., by simply adding another Justice to stall but not override the impact of recent Republican
appointments). See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4, at 196. While the Democrats’ use of this strategy
would admittedly have a number of pitfalls, its distinct advantage for Segall is that it would potentially
compel the Court to “produce narrower, more consensus-based decisions,” thereby bolstering its
legitimacy in the face of critical claims that hot-button issues are too often decided along starkly
ideological lines. Id. For Segall’s proposal, see Eric J. Segall, Eight Justices Are Enough: A Proposal
to Improve the United States Supreme Court, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 547 (2018).
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appointment will be approved by a Democratic or Republican Senate (and
maybe on whether there will be a fresh appointment at all).
Assuming that this first option will prove unsatisfactory for
Democrats who view court-packing as morally and strategically urgent,
consider a second, perhaps slightly more robust option. This time, while
the first move is once again an attempt to simply balance the Court with a
tenth Justice, the President now decides to act more aggressively by
relying on a supportive Congress to push his or her new Justice quickly
through the confirmation process (no delayed effective date this time).
However, alongside this marginally more aggressive stance, suppose that
the President and congressional leaders band together to make an
extraordinary pledge to the nation. They will not, they claim, pursue parts
of their legislative agenda that they believe the prior Court would have
invalidated or that are otherwise nationally controversial in the extreme—
not unless they hold onto Congress in the midterms. This proposal takes
us to the second factor mentioned above in assessing the plausibility of the
Democrats’ claim to be acting as constitutional conservatives: namely, the
aggressiveness with which they pursue their own reform agenda. Does an
Ackermanian approach require or favor anything like the extraordinary,
self-limiting pledge of this scenario?
I am not sure if an Ackermanian approach requires such selflimitation, but there are good reasons for supposing that it implies a
preference for it. Put simply, Ackerman’s very specific conception of
dualist democracy is clear in at least discouraging the mixing of
constitutional roles, specifically in the sense that proponents of reform
usually require a fresh mandate before they proceed to a new phase of the
higher lawmaking process158 (signaling, proposing, etc.159). In this regard,
it would certainly make sense to suppose that special caution is required
when a group of constitutional conservatives (in this case a Democratic
government purporting to use court-packing as a way of terminating
Republican transformation) wishes to shift not simply between stages of a
158. As evidence of this requirement under Ackerman’s theory, see ACKERMAN, supra note 31,
at 63–79 (illustrating the need for fresh mandates when transitioning between phases of constitutional
change during the civil rights movement).
159. Id. at 66, 72. I have not detailed all of the phases that Ackerman identifies in American
constitutional moments in this Article, partly because certain (especially later) phases are not strictly
relevant to my argument here, and partly because I believe that Ackerman’s theory is more than a
matter of identifying a highly specific set of stages that must be followed by subsequent reformers to
attain legitimacy. Rather, what Ackerman shows us above all—the radical core of his theory, if you
like—is that the American People can issue (and have issued) sovereign decisions in ways that are, at
the time, radically new (and is not this type of radical creativity the very essence of sovereignty?).
That said, if the reader wishes to survey the specific stages that Ackerman recognizes in recent
constitutional moments like the New Deal or the Civil Rights Revolution, a good place to start is with
the early chapters of We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution. See ACKERMAN, supra note 31.
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reform process, but to shift roles completely, from constitutional
conservatives to constitutional reformers. To legitimize this shift, I would
suggest strongly that Ackerman’s dualism requires an electoral return to
the voting population for support, but with this requirement a critical
reader may detect a problematic lack of political realism. Could we really
expect, this reader might ask, that a Democratic Party consumed by its
own, urgent sense of justice will consciously defer the implementation of
its political agenda despite momentarily having a wealth of political power
in its hands? Could we really ask the supporters and prospective
beneficiaries of that agenda to wait until after the midterms for
implementation? And would a newly elected government that stalled like
this really make it through those midterms unscathed, even if many voters
recognized its honorable, dualist intentions?
CONCLUSION
These questions on the realism and indeed tolerability of Ackermanstyle dualism are all vitally important, and they require some clarification
as well as some final analysis. To begin with, suppose I am right that
moderate court-packing in 2021 is defensible from an Ackermanian,
dualist point of view (although only in the very narrow and extremely
limiting way just described). Does this mean that court-packing or
balancing in 2021 can now be regarded as thinkable and, conversely, that
more ambitious court-packing plans should be regarded as unthinkable?
To answer this question bluntly, nothing that I have said over the course
of this Article justifies such a sweeping conclusion. On the contrary, my
argument—my only argument—is that Ackerman’s work offers an
important, non-populist way of defending the democratic legitimacy of
court-packing in 2021 (or more preferably at some point further down the
road, in the midst of time-tested support for Democrats and their
constitutional agenda). What the article does not say, and will not say, is
that democratic legitimacy should be the only or primary concern when
assessing the morality and wisdom of an initiative like court-packing.
Indeed, even Ackerman himself concedes that, despite his fundamental
concern with the facilitation of popular sovereignty and the “second
dimension”160 of democracy in America, political actors will sometimes
be well-advised to tolerate serious democratic deficits to ensure
implementation of a socially beneficial or morally praiseworthy initiative.
As Ackerman writes with respect to the Philadelphia Convention and its
democratic defects:

160. See COLÓN-RÍOS, supra note 22, at 36.
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[T]he Federalists were not conducting a philosophy seminar. They
were trying to win. Another round of elections would have given
Anti-Federalists a chance to win a lot of seats at the next convention,
enabling them to defeat the Federalists’ centralizing ambitions. The
majority in Philadelphia were utterly unwilling to take this chance. It
had taken a lot of hard work to get to Philadelphia, and Madison &
Co. were grimly determined to make the most of their opportunity.161

With this passage in mind, I want to finish now by very briefly
presenting two ways in which my Ackermanian perspective can be
seriously challenged. Firstly, one may argue that the level of deep and
bitter disagreement in the United States right now is such that any efforts
at constitutional transformation outside Article V would be doomed to
invite tireless and damaging accusations of “demagogic populism and
lawlessness”162 from a multitude of angles (consider this an argument
focusing on the “sociological legitimacy”163 of court-packing, if you like).
Secondly, one may argue that the intentionally slow and staggered pace of
change advocated by Ackerman’s dualism (and captured by the two
proposals put forward in the preceding Section) errs by leaving those
affected by problematic laws and policies to wait out their suffering,
haplessly, while their fellow citizens deliberate across a full generation.
Upon hearing these two counter-arguments, an Ackermanian dualist
may retort: indeed, these are problems, but they actually reveal the great
merit of Ackerman’s theory. To explain this claim, it should be obvious
from my framing of the two problems above that one cannot address both
of them at the same time, since resisting controversial strategies to mitigate
social or institutional “backlash”164 will mean abandoning your full pursuit
of justice (as you see it) and vice versa. However, as Ackerman argues in
the second volume of We the People, while we cannot have our cake and
eat it too, we can still try to walk the line between our most cherished
constitutional objectives.165 In this regard (and as noted earlier), Ackerman
presents his theory as a “third way”166 of dealing with constitutional
change—an approach that seeks to transcend the gulf between “legalistic

161. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 89.
162. See ACKERMAN, supra note 126.
163. See Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1843–44 (2005).
164. See generally Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 373 (2007).
165. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 33.
166. Id.; see also Sujit Choudhry, Ackerman’s Higher Lawmaking in Comparative
Constitutional Perspective: Constitutional Moments as Constitutional Failures?, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L.
193, 203 (2008).

2020]

Court-Packing in 2021

67

perfection”167 and “lawless force,”168 hopeless hesitance (in the face of
potential backlash), and overzealousness (in order to pursue justice as we
understand it). Isn’t this, the retorting dualist may ask, the best that we can
actually do given “the misfortune of how things are”169 in the increasingly
dis-United States?
Maybe so. But as a counterpoint, consider the following
hypothetical. Late in 2021, a Democratic President and Congress watch in
horror as the Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade,170 thereby legalizing
severely restrictive abortion laws of the type that numerous states have just
passed in our own, non-hypothetical reality.171 How do they respond? Do
they act swiftly to pack the Supreme Court or to reinstate Roe by less
secure means (e.g., ordinary legislation)? Or do they take a more
incremental approach, perhaps “balancing” the Court in the way I have
just proposed while pledging legislative restraint on controversial issues
like abortion until (or rather, unless) they retain their mandate in the
midterms. To the extent that Ackermanian dualism, on my no doubt
contestable reading, carries a preference for the latter path or some version
of it, how could we justify this choice to all those affected by the Supreme
Court’s decision in the interim? What do we say, for example, to the young
woman in Alabama who has been raped, but who, rather than finding the
criminal law by her side, now stares down the barrel of a system that
threatens her with serious violence if she terminates the resultant
pregnancy? Can we confidently present someone in her position with the
claim that, despite having the power to act, and despite their professed,
intense opposition to the Supreme Court’s decision, Democrats should
wait it out? No matter how we spin it, this is a deeply troubling question
for political and constitutional theories of the Ackermanian type—theories

167. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 116.
168. Id.
169. FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 8 (1999).
170. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). To clarify, I should note that this is a completely
hypothetical scenario, one that is less based on evidence that Roe is likely to be overruled and more
on the opportunity that the Court’s conservative majority now provides for the anti-abortion movement
in the United States.
171. See, e.g., Eric Levenson, Abortion Laws in the US: Here Are the States Pushing to Restrict
Access, CNN (May 30, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/16/politics/states-abortion-laws/index.
html [https://perma.cc/9GKX-NJU2].
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that advocate “minimalism”172 over “heroism”173 to borrow Cass
Sunstein’s terminology. Is it a question that is troubling enough to warrant
a more heroic, urgent approach on issues like abortion, an approach that
may involve endorsing more extreme forms of court-packing (or related
tactics) than my reading of Ackerman allows for? I leave that up to you
but with a residual question attached. The question is, if you believe your
perspective on such issues is right, and you believe that your government
is entitled to act decisively despite deep disagreement within your society
on a given issue, what separates you from the populists who believe that
“they, and they alone, can represent the people”?174 I do not mean to
suggest that this question is unanswerable; only that it is a critical moral
and strategic question for American liberals in the months and years ahead.

172. I borrow this term from Cass Sunstein, who uses it to refer to judges (although I dare say
that it is usefully applicable to political actors in general). To quote:
Some judges are . . . Minimalists, in the sense that they favor small, cautious steps, building
incrementally on the decisions and practices of the past. Unlike Heroes, who celebrate
ambitious accounts of liberty and equality or of the Constitution’s structural provisions,
those who adopt the minimalist Persona emphasize the limits of large-scale theories. They
emphasize that human beings, and judges in particular, have a limited stock of reason. They
embrace the idea of humility.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONAE: HEROES, SOLDIERS, MINIMALISTS, AND MUTES 16
(2015).
173. To quote Sunstein: “The defining characteristic of judicial heroes is that they are big and
bold. They are entirely willing to invoke an ambitious understanding of the Constitution to invalidate
the decisions of the federal government and the states.” Id.
174. See MÜLLER, supra note 1, at 3 (emphasis added).

